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ABSTRACT 
This study reports on the pe rformance of experimental marke ts 
characterized by industrial structure and practice s similar to those 
at issue in the Ethyl case, The ce ntral que stion is whether price 
competition is affected by the practice s of advanced notification of 
price changes and ''most-favored nation" contracts or is de termined by 
industrial organization and conce ntration alone, 
nrn EFFECTS OF MARKET PRACTICES IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ETIIYL CASE• 
I .  IN1RODUCTION 
David M, Grether and Charles R .  Plott 
California Institute of T echnology 
In May of 1979 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) filed a 
complaint1 against the produc ers of lead-based antiknock compounds,
the gasoline additives that raise the octane level , The FTC asked 
that the four dom estic produc ers in the industry c ease and d esist from 
using market practices that, according to FTC theory, facilitated a 
r eduction in price competition in violation of S ection S of th e 
Federal Trade Commission Act, lS U , S , C, §4S. As part of th e general 
defense, experts claimed that the conduct of th e industry could be 
explained as r esulting from industrial structure alone, th e practices 
had no discernible effect, and thus th e relief sought by the FTC would 
be in effective and should be d enied , This study reports on the 
behavior of laboratory markets characterized by th e prominent 
structural featur es of the lead-based antiknock compound industry with 
and without practices similar to some of those at issue in the 
litigation . 
The industry structur e is one of th e major param eters in all 
theories applied in the analysis of the cas e, and there is little or 
no controversy over its key features. The products, tetraethyl lead, 
tetram ethyl lead, and mixes of these two compoun ds, are homogeneous 
2 
across produc ers ,  Demand is g enerally believed to be in elastic i n  the 
vicinity of existing price s ,  Entry was etfectively blocked during the 
period ot th e complaint (January 1, 1 97 4  to May 31, 1 97 9 )  because 
demand was exp ected to be significantly reduced du e to Environm ental 
Protect ion Agency regulations r egarding the phaseout of th e use of 
lead in gasolin e .  The products are used only as a gasolin e aaditive .  
There are only four firms in the industry, Ethyl Corporation, E .  I ,  du 
Pont d e  Nemours and Company, PPG Industries, Inc , ,  and Nalco Ch emical 
Corporation. Th e two largest firms apparently poss ess exc ess 
capacity, and the other two firms ar e r elatively small, 12 percent and 
18 percent of th e market r espectively . T en iarge buyers out ot one
hundred and fifty or more account for approximately 60 percent of the 
market. 
Three practices are challenged by the FTC complaint . 
A, Advanced Notice and Price Announcements . Suppliers agr eed to give 
at least a thirty-day notice of all pric e incr eas es . Th ese price 
announcements were transmitted to customers by tel ephone and 
telegram and, in addition, were announced to the press . Price 
announ cements were usually made in advance (three to eight days ) 
of th e thirty-day deadline by firms initiating a price change ,  
B. Most Favored Nation , Th e  two large producers consistently used 
''most favored nation'' clauses in contracts, and the other two 
suppliers used them in various ways . Tho central featur e of this 
practice is to guarante e to each customer that no other customer 
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will obtain a like quantity and quality at a lower price ,  
C ,  D elivered Pricing . Deliv ered pricing is practiced by all four 
firms. Each firm quotes a list price for a given compound 
delivered to th e purchaser regardless of the location of th e 
producer.  
Th e  Commission's administrative law judge summarized the facts 
as follows : 
Th e facts r elating to the us e of th e challenged practices by th e 
r espondents are not controv erted , All respondents us e 30-day 
advance notic e of price increas es; until mid-1 97 7, all 
respondents issued pr ess notices or pric e changes; all 
respondents utilize delivered pricing, and uniform delivered 
pricing with respect to all list price transactions .  Respondents 
Ethyl and DuPont utilize most favored nation clauses in their 
contracts with customers (these r espondents did not have 
contracts with all custom ers ) ;  and Nalco had most favored nation 
claus es in all its contracts until 1 978, and with a f ew contracts 
th ereafter (this respondent also did not have contracts with all 
its customers ) ,  Use of th e practices having b e en establish ed, it 
r emains to d etermine the effect of th e practices on competition , 
[U . S .  Initial D ecision, 1 981, p .  1 35] 
The FI'C claim is that th e practic es, combined with th e 
industrial structur e, enabled suppliers to maintain prices above 
competitive levels (Complaint Counsel'• Proposed Finding, 1 981 ) . Th e 
theory is based on th e hypoth esis that competition is aided by 
uncertainty about rival firms' actions and/or r eactions to pricing 
d ecisions , First, th e uso of delivered pricing policies reduces th e 
dim ensions in which pric e concessions can be made thereby r educing the 
unc ertainty about the terms which competitors have off er ed to 
individual custom ers and the magn itud e of pric e changes , S econdly, 
th e greater th e us e of th e most favored nation claus es by a firm, th e 
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mor e  the tendency for a firm to charge all customers th e sam e pric e 
for a given product and giv e  secret price discounts to no one .  Th e  
d elivered pricing policy buttresses this most favored nation practic e 
by making the term, ''price,'' reasonably unambiguous , That is, it 
h elps prevent effective special price discounts which might exist 
wider som e  other nam e ,  Tho two practices together thus reduce 
un c ertainty about a competitor's actions and, by virtue of the market 
structure, facilitate the stability of higher prices through a process 
2 of conj ectural variations . The most favored nation clause can a1so 
add stability in another way . Buyers tend to b eliev e  that any price 
concession or discount obtained will automatically b e  extended to 
other custom ers , A discount to a single custom er would thus be more 
costly to the supplier than the production and d elivery cost of th e 
marginal product and would thus be less likely to be granted, Knowing 
this, buyers as individuals (and thus as a group ) bargain less 
tenaciously and are a less important source of potential disruption of 
price stability , Th e  conclusion is that the first two practices 
contribute to price stability at whatever price level happens to have 
b e en establish ed , 
Th e advance notice provision helps establish th e pric e level .  
Price increases ar e usually announced s ev eral days before th e deadline 
for an announcem ent . That is, if a thirty-day advance notic e was the 
policy, then an increase would be announced, say, thirty-s ev en days 
prior to th e date that the price increase was to tak e effect . Tilis 
announcement, mad e publicly through the n ewspapers, would be 
transmitted to oompetitors immediately and aocurately, Oth er firms 
whioh have a similar thirty-day advanoe notice polioy have seven days 
in whioh to respond, If they matoh the higher prioe, th en all firms 
have stable prices at th e higher lev el, If any firm does not match 
th e prio e, then the announ c ed price increase will b e  r escinded,
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and 
the nonmatching firm will gain no volume from its nonconforming 
behavior, In this strategic environm ent, each firm has a dominant 
strategy to match the price increase as long as it anticipates higher 
profits from J.Q!!U upward price mov ements, No firm has an incentive 
5 
to "chisel" or "un dercut" the pric es of others, Thus th e process ot 
prior announoem ent provid es a dynamic elem ent through which price 
lev els oan be establish ed and th e practioes taken as a group serve to 
coordinate aotions and reduce price oompetition . 4 A natural 
theoretioal extension of th e argum ent leads to a prediction that 
prices should e quilibrate at the lowest of th e optimum industry prices 
from the individual firm's point of view , 
Eoonomic experts (D ennis M, Carlton, Michael L, Glassman, 
George A, Hay, H .  Michael Mann, and J esse W. Markham) who testified in 
th e case have b e en in substantial agr e ement about the facts ot the 
case r egarding the economic struotur e of th e industry, The 
plausibility of the governm ent' a theory as it relates to th e basio 
principles of economics was also not a subj ect of debate, Th e  
controversy surfaced in the analysis o f  industrial conduct and th e 
relativ e role of the chall enged practices in accounting for 
performance . 
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Nonprice competition and disoounts oould be obs erved . Neither 
advance notioe nor pric e publioation was always followed , Market 
shares ohanged, Transportation oosts were  relativ ely low .  Most 
favored nation claus es were not in all contracts . Information about 
competitors' list pric es was readily available from customers and 
ther e was frequently little time d elay b etwe en th e time a price ohange 
was announc ed and the first time information of the change r eached a 
competitor, Opinions about costs and profits differed, Such facts 
led to diff ering evaluations about how much competition actually 
exists in th e industry and what one would expeot to s e e  in terms ot 
suoh variables in an industry with a market structur e like that ot th e 
lead-based antiknock compound industry . 
The Commission's administrative law judge summariz ed the 
oontroversy as follows : 
R espond ents' eoonomic exp erts were unanimous in their opinion 
that the struotur e of the industry was th e d etermining factor on 
th e oompetitive performance of the industry; and that the 
industry was performing as oompetitively as would bo expected 
based on th e struotur e .  Dr . Hay, oomplaint counsel's expert, 
testified that th e struotural oharacteristics in oonjunction with 
the challenged praotices had r eduoed the vigor ot comp etition, 
and that in th e absenoe of th e practices, oompetition would have 
b e en more vigorous , [U . S. Initial D ecision, 1 98 1, p, 136] 
Th e issue to be explored in this study is the potential etfect 
of praotic es similar to some of those in th e Ethyl litigation over and 
above that ot industrial structur e .  Can such a set of practices 
facilitate a reduction in pric e competition or do supracompetitiv e 
prices and profits n ecessarily constitute an equilibrium within an 
industry with this structur e? Th e laboratory mark ets studied below 
were designed to answer tha t  que st ion, The pract i ce s  examined are  
simil ar to  pract ice s chal l enged by the FTC compl a int,  and the 
industr i e s  stud i ed are simil ar in struc t ur e  (but much smaller  in 
sca l e )  t o  the l ead-b a sed a nt iknock compound industry. 
2 ,  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A, Procedure s  ' 
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Subj e c t s  were recrui ted from Pa sade na Ci ty Col l ege,  the 
Cal if ornia Inst i tute of Technol ogy, and the Pa sadena bus ine ss  
commun i ty.  Al l subj ect s had partic ipa ted i n  a t  l ea st one l abora tory 
experimental marke t pri or to par t i c ipating in the experiment s r eported 
here,  and many subj ect s had participa ted i n  several such experiment s,' 
Prev ious experimenta l  research had sugge s ted  tha t  exper ience may be an· 
important variab l e  in ol igopol istic  experimental  marke ts  but, aside 
from that var i abl e ,  no subj ect pool differ ence s ( age , sex, educa t i on, 
na tional i ty,  e tc, )  have been documented to da t e .  
Al l experiments were conducted in Baxter Hel l a t  the 
Cal if orni a Inst i tute of Te chnology and each l a sted be tween three and 
four hours, Subj e c t s  were randomly assigned to an incent ive structur e  
a s  explained below and t o  a n  office, Instruct i ons were read, 
que st i ons were answered publ icly, and subj e c t s  compl e ted a 1 ' te s t ' ' 
de signed to check  the ir  unde r standing of the rul e s, incent ive 
struc t ure,  e tc, The instruc t i ons are incl uded a s  an appendi x .  The 
suppl ier s were given a special sheet not seen by buyer s on which the 
marke t demand funct ion was graphed a nd i t s  meani ng was  expl ained to  
them, Thi s  i s  a l so incl uded e s  pert of  the instruct ions,  
Mo st of the experiment s r eported here were not conducted 
according t o  any pl an known t o  the aubj e c t s .  This reduced the 
po ssibil ity of over t col lusi on, The exceptions are experiment s 8 
through 11 which were held on consecutive nigh ts w i th the same 
subj e c t s, but on any g iven night they did not know the na tur e  of the 
experiment for the next n i ght. The po ssibi l i ty of col lusion external 
to the experiment a l  s e t t ing w a s  a l so reduced by a pol icy of changing 
the demand and supply funct i on s  by a scal ar 10 the pri ce uni t s  were 
not readi ly comparab l e, 
B. Parame ter s 
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Lead-b a sed  a nt iknock  c ompounds are added to fuel to i ncre a se 
the octane ratings . The two b a s i c  product s, tetraethyl lead (''TEL'') 
and te trame thyl lead ( ' ' TML ' ' )  a re homogeneous product s  i n  that no 
qua l i ta tive differ ence s exist  among the product s  sol d by d i f f erent 
manufacturers, Mixtur e s  of these two ba sic product s are  al so aol d  but 
these do not differ in qual i ty among produce r s .  Other chemical 
produ c t s  exi s t  which can incr e a se the octane rat ings of ga sol ine , but 
the se are r e l a t ively expensive. Oct a ne ratings can al so be increa sed 
by add i t i ona l proce ssing ( c a talytic  reforming ) but it is a l so more 
costly,  Thus, the commodi t i e s  ere homogeneous w i th no sub s t i tute s in 
the price range s wider consider ation ,  
Tho product homogene i ty wa s incorporated in the l abora tory 
markets but only a single commodi ty existed in the l aboratory marke t s  
rather titan tile two ba sic  commod i t i e s  and the mixe s.  Indiv idua l 
demands for a single, homogeneous commodi ty were induced, by 
5 appl ica t ion of induced preference theory, in the fol low ing manner .  
Buyers made money by purchasing from sel lers and resel l ing to  the 
experimenter,  The terms of resale dictated  the i ndividual demand 
e l ast ici ties and volume demands .  Likew ise , sel l ers made money by 
buying f rom the experimenters and resel l ing to  the buyers, The cost  
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schedul e faced by indiv idual sel l ers dictated their  capaci ty, marginal 
costs, and other aspects  of variabl e coats,  It was unnecessary for 
sel l ers to carry inventory of the product because they could,  up to  
capaci ty limits, produce i nstantly to satisfy demands, and  they would 
only incur the v ariab l e  cost associated  w i th production, 
The marke t demand and supply funct ions are  displ ayed i n  
Figure 1 .  The actua l  shape o f  the demand funct i on is approximately 
the right hal f of an i nverted pa rabo l a  w i th the equa tion 
2 p = l,81 - Q /256.
W ith this equa t ion and the supply funct ion as shown, the compe t i t ive 
equi l ibrium is t.5 4 per uni t .  Demand e l ast i c i ty is . 218 in the range 
of the compe t i tive oquil ibrium.  The second-orde r curve was chosen 
rather than a l inear curve because the responsiveness of demand t o  
price i n  these pr i ce r anges i s  l ikely to  depend primarily upon 
suba t i tutes rather than the effect on gasol ine pr ice and gasol ine 
demand in the retail  marke t .  Subs t i tutes are l ike ly to become 
ava i l able  in vol um e  once they become econom ica l ly feasibl e  r e l ative to 
l e ad-based compounds. This accounts for the subs ta nt i al ly reduced 
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range of the oompe t i tive equil ibrium is probably more ine l a stio than 
is the demand for l e ad-b a sed a nt iknook oompounds at current price 
l evel s, However,  as price increases ,  el ast icity incre a se s ;  for 
exampl e ,  el a s t ic i ty is ,69 at tl.05 and it i s  1,10 a t  tl . 25, By 
mul t iply ing the un i t s  in the experiment by a fac t or of two million and 
considering the t ime period to be two weeks, each uni t  would repre sent 
two m i l l ion pounds,  and i t s value would be two m i l l ion t im e s  the 
price; Na tural ly such sca l ar transforms preserve all of the rel evant 
economio parame ter s ,  
In tota l ,  there were  nine buyers in the  experiment , The 
marke t demand function shown i n  the  f igure i s  the  aggrega tion of the 
individual demand funct ions, but the indiv idua l funct ions  ca n be 
inferred a s  fol l ow s ,  Index t h e  buyer s a s  1 through 9, and l e t  tho 
number s  under the demand funct ion r epre sent the buyer who had a uni t  
w i th a l im i t  price a t  tha t value,  The demand funct ion ( o r  l imit price 
funct i on)  of buyer 5, for example,  had one uni t  a t  $1.43 and a second 
at $.61, At industrial soa l e  thi s  r epr e sent s  a buyer who would have 
annual purchase s of 104 mil l ion pounds if  the pr ice was as l ow a s  
t,S4, As c a n  be seen from the f igure ,  buyer s 1 through 8 a r e  a l l  
about the same siz e ,  and the se eight buyer s a r e  a l l  about equa l ly 
s izeo a nd const i tute about 7 0  percent of the marke t ,  depending upon 
the prioe l evel . Buyer 9 i s  a pa ssive buyer repr e senting a l arge 
number of smal l consumer s and about 30 percent of the marke t .  1nis 
buyer, who was phy sica l ly located in the control room with 
experimenters  so some monitoring was po ssib l e ,  simply ca l l ed suppliers 
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at random ( unl e s s  one had a l ower price , then he would call  the l owe st 
priced sel l e r )  and purchase a singl e uni t  at the quoted price without 
6 negotiating,  haggling, or making prom ise s about the futur e .  Th e se 
sta tistic s  are t o  be compared w i th those of the industry in whioh the 
e i ght l arge st buyer s aooount for about SO or SS percent of al l sal e s  
and the l arge st twe l ve acoount for from 60 perce nt t o  70 percent, 
Marke t supply as shown in the f igure is f l at at approximately 
$.S4 with sub s tant i al exce sa  oapa o i ty s t  tha t price, At the 
oompe t i tive equil ibrium of $,S4, the l aboratory marke t would be at 7 8  
percent o f  capaci ty and a t  a slightly higher price ( e , g , , $,65) the 
industry would be  at only 56 perce nt of capacity. Marginal cost s 
increase r apidly a s  the capaci ty limit s  are reached but,  a s  shown in 
the figure ,  some capaci ty s t i l l  becom e s  avai l ab l e  a t  price l evel s of 
$1.so. 
The s e l l e r s  are indexed A, B, C, D. 7 Both A a nd B are l arge
sel ler s w ith similar  cost and capaci ty structur e s, The f irm marginal  
cost  curve can be deduced f rom the supply ourve . The l e tter over the 
supply curve indica tes  which f irm can supply a uni t  a t  tha t  marg i nal 
oost, Thus f irm A can supply thre e  uni ts  at $,40, seven addi t i onal 
uni ts  at t .S4, and an addi tional w1i t  at e ach of $,63, $. 7 S, and 
h.oo. 
As can be seen f rom the individual costs ,  the _Jwo l arge 
sel l ers have about 82 perce nt of the total capaci ty . At industrial  
scal e  this would transl ate  into  a capaci ty of 988 mil l ion pounds per 
year for the two l 11rge suppl ier s a t  the l ow compe titive pr ice and 
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about 208 mill ion pounds oapa o i ty for the two sma l l  suppl ier s .  If the 
price doubl ed, total oapa o i ty would be inorea sed by 29 peroent and a l l  
o f  thi a  would b e  from the two b i g  suppl ier s .  A t  a price of t.6S the
two l arge suppl iers would have an e xce ss  oapac i ty of 572 mill ion 
pounds per year . Those parameters are a l l  w i thin the range s e st imated 
8 by exper t s ,  The oonce ntr a t ion on the supply side of the marke t s  we 
9 study i s  sl ightly higher than that of the industry. Pre sumably, th i s  
b i a s e s  t h e  resul t s  against  the FfC ca se ,  
The numbe r  of  sel ler s was f ixed a t  four for  the dur a t ion of 
the experiment . Nei ther entry nor pl ant expansion was  po ssibl e beyond 
that impl i o i t  in the supply ourves ,  Th i s  a spect reflect s the 
gene r a l ly aooepted  propo s i tion that the ant ioipated de ol ine ot demand 
for l ead-b a ae d  antiknock oompounds would p r event entry. 
C, Prao t ioe a 
Com11unica t ion took two forma.  Th e  pr imary form was  by 
tel ephone , and the second form was by a d i g i tal  d i spl ay dev ice which 
was used to announoe price s ,  Buyer s ( se l l e r s )  had phone numbers  for 
sel l er s ( buyer s )  but not other buyers ( se l l er s ) ,  Dur ing a period they 
were free to oal l  each other for oontraot s but no phone conversat ions 
were al l owed be tween peri ods, 
The di g i ta l  di spl ay dev ice was de s i gned for price 
announoement s .  The dev ice a s  shown in Figure 2 consisted  o f  four 
modu l e s ,  Each modul e had a push-button keypad,  much l ike that of a 
hand-hel d  calcul a tor, and thirteen di g i ta l  rece iver uni t s ,  e ach 
capa b l e  of di spl ay ing a three-d i g i t  number and thirteen r ece iver 
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pane l s .  Thu s ,  if a sel l er entered a number on the keypad, thi s number 
would be di spl ayed simul taneously on a l l  thirteen rece iver uni t s  
connected  w i th the keypad; e . g . , the number 123 would be s o  di spl ayed, 
or the number 3 woul d appe ar as 003, 1ne l arge st number which could 
be transm i tted was  999. A rece iver uni t  from each of the four keypads 
was mounted on e ach of the thirteen rece iver pane l s .  The dev ice had 
no capabil i ty for communica t ing seleotively with rece iv er s .  Any 
number entered wa s nece ssarily di spl ayed t o  al l rece iver pane l s ,  but 
it was  possible  for the exper imenter to cover the rece iver uni t  w i thin 
a panel so that only me s sage s sent from sel ected keyboards were 
di spl ayed .  Thi s  a l l owed the po ssib i l ity for a sel l er to have a 
receiver panel and see the pr ice ( s ) he di spl ayed but not ,  for exampl e ,  
the prioe s of other sel l e r s .  
I n  t otal, the dev ioe consi sted  o f  four keypads  e ach o f  whioh 
could oommunica te w i th thirteen r ece ivers.  This a l l owed e ach buyer 
f our rece ivers,  e ach ca rrying the number entered from one of the 
keypad s ,  I f ,  for exampl e ,  eaoh of four sel l er s  had a keypad,  e ach 
could e nter a prioe  whioh would be seen by everyone who had a rece iver 
uni t  a ttached to  that keypad;  e . g . , the sel l er, other sel l er s ,  al l 
buyer s ,  and the experimente r ,  By al tering who had a oce s s  to  the 
sending a nd rece iv ing uni ts and the rul e s  of communica t ing, pr act ice s 
similar to those of the Ethyl ca se could be impl emented and s t ud i ed .  
Before prov iding a n  interpreta t ion o f  the laboratory marke ts  
in terms of  industry pr actice s, the l aboratory marke t s  themselves  w ill  
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c haracterized by four d i fferent variables, so the practice s  are 
indexed by a four- tuple, The first  component. denotes the agent s who 
were allowed to make the pri ce announcements exp l a ined bel ow ,  The 
letter s N, A, L, which const i tute the range of the f irst  variable, 
represent: N = no price announcement s; A =  al l sel ler s  make pr ice 
announcement s; L = large sel ler s make pr ice announcement s ,  The second 
component, which denotes those who were able to receive the pr ice 
announcements,  t ake s the two val ue s  a s  fol l ow s :  A =  a l l  par t icipant s 
receive the pri ce announ cement s; B = only the buyer s and not the 
sel ler s  receive the announcement s ,  The third v ar i able takes the value 
Y i f  a moat f avored na tion pract i ce w a s  uniformly imposed on sel ler s  
making price announcements ,  and i t  takes the value N i f  not , If N i s  
in the third p l a ce, then f irms c a n  d i scount f r om  announced price s ,  
The fourth and f inal variable takes the value Y i f  pr ior not i f ic a t ion 
i s  requi red f or pri ce increa ses, and i t  takes the value N if not .  
Thus,  the nota tion (A, B, Y , Y )  meana that a l l  firm s had pol icy pri ce 
announcement s which were received only by buyer s ( a nd not sel lers ) ;  
all  firms used most  favored na tion cl auses and prior not i f ica tion of 
pri ce i ncrea ses, 
We did not examine ei ther del ivered price pol icies or pres s  
release pol ic ies,  Thi s  reflec t s  l im i ta tions pl aced on the experiment s 
by prev ious exper imental work in the f ield and by current exper imental 
technol ogy, The inclus i on of transporta t ion co s t s ,  mixing , and other 
compl ica t ions which would expand the single homogeneous commodi ty to 
one with several dimensions (e, g , ,  the commod i ty plus transpor ta tion 
serv ice s )  and make i t  more consonant to the industry in which the 
del ivered price pol icy i s  operat ive would have al so pl aced a 
sub s tant ial  burden on the study. Computations would be more complex 
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for par t i cipant s so addi tional time would be nece s sary for conduct i ng 
the experiment s ,  Few experiment s have been conducted w ith mul t iple 
commod i ties so the l aboratory procedures for new experiment• would not 
have the advant a ge ot' having been ' ' d i s t i l l ed ' ' by considerable prev ioua 
use in l aboratory s t udies,  More complex s i tua t i ons  can be accompanied 
by more m i stake s  and other sources  ot' randomne s s  10 the number of 
exper iment s required would be increa sed if mul t iple commod i ties were 
used , Li ter a l ly speaking, since transporta t i on cost s were alway s zero 
in these experiments ,  the del ivered pri c i ng pol icy is a lways i n  
effec t .  
The primary focus o f  the study i s  on  only two trea tment 
cond i tions, the ca se where there are no practice s  and the ca se where 
a l l  pract ices are used by the two l argest  sel ler s .  In the cour se or 
the experiments ,  however, the opportun i ty to obta i n  a prel iminary 
examina t i on ot some of the variati ons  in t he practices presented 
i tsel f ,  The seven treatment variables on which some da ta were 
ga thered are l isted bel ow, and are ordered a ccord ing to the degree to 
which al l of the pr act i ces were present. Thus the l i st begi n s  w i th 
the ca se in which there are no pract i ce s  and end s w i th the ca se in 
which all  pract ices considered were oper a t ing by a l l  firm s .  
Privately negot i a ted prices ( N, - , N, N) . In thi s market, contract 
pr ices were priv atel y nego tiated by telephone, Each suppl ier was  f ree 
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w i thin the constraints  set by costs  to fol low whatever pr i c i ng pol icy· 
de sired, but the dev ice was  not avai l able f or pri ce announcement s, 
There was no expect a t ion that a most f avored na tion cl ause would be 
enforced, Suppl ier s neces sarily rel ied on cus tomer s a s  the sole 
source ot informat ion about the pri c i ng pol icies and price level s of 
competi tor s ,  
Nonpubliq priqe lists (A, B, N, N) .  This  pract i ce was  implemented by use 
of the di spl ay dev ice, Each suppl ier was given a keypad, but the 
pri ce s  were di spl ayed to the buyer s only. Eac h  suppl ier had a 
receiver panel so his/ her own pr ice announcement s  could be moni tored, 
but the receiver uni t s  of other suppl ier s were bl ocked out so their 
transm i s s i ons could not be seen. Di scoun t s  f rom announced pr ices were 
allowed so the most f avored na tion pract ice s  were not oper at ive, The 
' ' ba i t  and sw i tch tac t i cs ' ' of adver t i sing a l ow pr ice but refusing to 
sel l at that pri ce were not perm itted . 
Nonpublic price announcements with most fayored nation (A, B, Y, N) . As 
above, each suppl ier was  given a keypad a nd a l l  price s  were di spl ayed 
to buyers onl y .  Wi th the most f avored nation cl ause no d i scount ing 
from the announced pr ice was a l l owed , Thus, a l l  buyer s pa id t he same 
price during a period when the same pr i ce was  being announced , A 
sel ler could l ower the pr ice to male a sale but a l l  order s made while 
the price was l owered were necessarily fil lod at that price,  Because 
price announcement s wero nonpubl ic, sel ler s  could bocome informed 
about a oompo t i t or ' s pr ice only if informed by a buyer or buyer s,  
Pub l ic price announcement• ( L, A, N, N) ,  10 Both l arge sel ler s  had 
keypads, and a l l  partic ipant s, both sel lers and buyer s, had receiver 
un i t s. Thus, pr ice announcement s by large sel ler s  were immed i a tely 
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seen by a l l  par t i c ipant s, Di scoun t s  f rom these announced prices were 
po s sible and were pr iva tely negot i a ted , Al l pr ices of the two smal l 
sel ler s  were pr ivately negot i a ted , Th i s  i s  similar  to a ca se i n  which 
l ist  prices are publ icly avail able, oostlessl y  changed, and may differ 
from actual  transaction prices .  
Public price announcements and most fayored nations (A, A, Y, N) , Al l 
sel ler s  had keypads and a l l  par t i c ipant s had rece iver uni ts, so pl'ice 
announcement s were seen by al l parti c ipant s .  Al l contra c t s  were 
executed a t  the announced price s .  These practice s  have element s ot 
the del ivered price pol i cy since pr ices could easily and unamb i guously 
be communi c a ted a nd under stood, Jn thi s context the most favored 
na t i on cl ause, which prohib i t s  secret di scoun t s  a c t s  in many respect s  
ident i ca l ly to that used i n  the l ead-ba sed ant ilnocl compound 
industry. If nonprice compe t i t i on a nd serv ice s are i gnored, the 
c l ause guarantees the same pri ce to those who purchase l ike quant i ty 
and qua l i ty ,  
All prac t iqes ( L, A, Y, Y )  a nd (A, A, Y, Y ) ,  Sel ler s (ei ther the two l arge 
sel ler s only in some c a se s  a nd a l l  sel ler s  in other o a se s )  made publ ic 
price announcement s .  Al l transa c t i ons took pl ace a t  announced prices,  
Price increa ses were a l l owed only af ter one ful l peri od of advance 
not if ica tion.  Thi s was  accompl i shed w i th the aid of a second keypad 
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11 in ( L, A, Y, Y )  and by a spec ial  s i gnal in (A, A, Y, Y ) . For example, if 
a l arge sel ler des i red to i ncrea se pr ice in period 8, thi s  w a s  
announced to  a l l  partic ipant s prior to the beg inning of peri od 7. 
Price decrea ses oould be made a t  any t ime, but once pr i ce w a s  reduced, 
i t  could not be raised w i thout the proper not i f ica t ion. In thi s 
trea tment, volume da ta for al l suppl ier s was  a l so made ava i l able a t  
the end of each period, thereby ref lect ing a s i tua t ion i n  which 
informat i on is rea sonably accur ate .  
Of  pr imary interest are the ca se s  ( !lr NN) and ( LAYY ) . The 
trea tment (llrNN) seems to  be  the most  anal ogous to  the si tua t ion which 
is supposed to exi st  if the remedy sought by the FI'C i s  succe ssful ly 
implemented , The trea tment (LAYY) i s  most anal ogous to  the si tua tion 
which now exi s t s .  
Two treatment s (ABNN) and (AAYY ) are o f  l i ttle interest and 
were included only as checks . On a pri ori  grounds one would expect 
marke t behavior under treatment (ABNN) to be approximately the same a s  
(!lrNN) . I f  competi tor s  oannot directly moni tor pri ce announcement s  
and i f  the announced prices themselves are subj ect t o  d i scount, one 
woul d expect very l ittle difference from no announcement s a t  a l l .  
Adver t i sing m ight have a n  effect on buyer behav ior to  the extent tha t 
search costs  a re important and to the extent that adver ti sed prices 
reflected actua l  pr ices .  Aside from thi s effect, which is expected to  
be small  in these marke t s ,  one would expect (ABNN) a nd (llr NN) to be 
the same, Simil arly, ( AAYY) should bo the same as ( LAYY) . TI1e volume 
of the two smal l  sel ler s is so low that they should adjus t to the 
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pricing pol icies of the l arger sel ler s ,  Thus, a s  i s  impl ici t in the 
model s outl ined in the next sect i on ( LAYY) and (AAYY) should exhib i t  
approximately the same behav ior. Only one exper iment w ith ( AAYY) wa s 
conducted a s  a check .  
The other three treatments  are o f  independent interes t .  The 
treatment s (ABYN) and (AAYN) are simil ar to ci rcumstances which could 
evolve from Robi nson-Pa tman prov ision s . Al l buyer s pay the same l i st  
pr ice s  which are known oo stlessly to buyer s .  Under (AAYN) sel ler s 
have acce s s  t o  the same pri c ing i nformation a s  buyer s, wherea s under 
( ABYN) sel ler s  do not .  The trea tment ( LANN) prov ide s some insight 
into the pure effect of pub l i c  price announcement s ,  
3 • COMPETING MODELS
Two different que s t ions are identif ied, (1) Do the pract i ce s  
make a difference? ( 2) What model s most accur ately capture 
experience s w ith the behav ior of marke t s  w i th the struc t ure described 
above? The f ir s t  que s t i on i s  a purely sta t i s t ical  que s t i on once the 
experimenta l  de s i gn has  been set ,  Th e  second que s t i on i s  more 
compl ica ted beca use of the exi stence of a rich and varied set of 
model s which differ according to the role of t ime, product 
different i a t ion, the na ture of the strategy spaces, etc .  The mode l s  
expl ored here are a l l  sta t i c  and are ba sed o n  the hypothe s i s  that the 
product i s  perfectly homogeneous across sel ler s .  
The model s c a n  most easily be explained by reference to oa ses 
in which all fun c t ions are different iable. The number s  l i sted a s  
predictions,  however, are derived from the d i s crete anal ogs , Tho 
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individual l arge sel l er, i, has an incent ive to sa t i sfy the equa tion . 
where xi i s  the volume of sel l er i; P(x1 + x2 + 2k ) i s  the inverse
marke t demand f unct ion; k i s  the constant volume of a smal ler  sel ler  
constrained by capa c i ty; C(xi ) is  the cost fun c t i on of  sel l e r  i ,  The
equa t i on simply refl e c t s  optimiz ing behav ior and the  a s sumpt i on that 
smal l sel l ers behave i n  a price fol lower rol e and are  aggr e s sive only 
to the extent nece s sary to sel l a volume of k ,  
Th e  term axj / axi i s  the react ion by firm j a s  ant i c ipa ted by
firm i to a change in the volume of f irm i .  A cont inuum of  model s  can 
be  d eriv ed f rom thi s  formul ation by l e t t ing ax
j / ax i range from -1 to 1
( see  Tel ser 197 2  p. 152-5 3 ) . The term is i n  a sense a mea sure of 
perce ived interrela tedne ss and i ndica te s that compe t i tion goe s down a s  
auch awarene ss  goe s up, For purpo s e s  of analys i s  we arbi trarily 
restri c t  the c l a s s  of adm i s sible  models t o  only four , 
Competitive EguilibriU!!! and the Bertrapd Model .  I f  axj / axi = -1, the
behav i oral equa t i on above become s  P = MC, The compe t i tive 
interpretat ion is that sel lers  v iew the ir act i ons as having no 
perce p t ib l e i nf l uence on price because any volum e  increases  w ill  be 
off s e t  by vol ume decrea s e s  el sewhere ,  Th e  Ber trand ol igopoly 
interpretation i s  that tho firm bel ieves  cust omer s  can be stolen from 
a compe ti tor by sl ight pr ice reduct i ons and such reduct i ons will  be 
met only pa ssively if at  al l .  
I f  the marke t share s be tween the two l arge sel l ers are equal 
or near equa l ,  thi s  equa t ion i s  sa t i sf ied at $ , 5 4, Thus both the 
compe t i tive equil ibrium model and the Bertrand mode l pr ed ict $ ,5 4 .  
The vol um e  predict ion i s  e i gh teen uni t s  per period, 
Cournot EguilibriUDI. If axj / axi = O, each sel ler i s  a ssum ing that
price r educt i ons w i l l  be met w i th suf f ic i ent speed to  protect  sal e s  
volume mea sured in physi cal uni t s ,  If quant i t i e s  rather than price s 
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are v iewed as the control variab l e s ,  then according to thi s model each 
se l l er pl ay s  a be st reply strategy against the quant i ti e s  offered by 
the other sel l er .  The equil ibrium i s  thus Na sh , If vol um e s  are near 
equal , the price  which suppor t s  the Cournct equil ibrium i s  $1. 04 , The 
volume predic t i on is four teen uni t s .  
Price Leadership Joint MaximUDI. Each of the two large f irms may 
bel ieve that pri ce cut s w i l l  st imul a te further price cut s .  If i t  i s  
bel i eved t h e  compe t i tive react ion w il l  b e  sufficiently vigorous t o  
protect exi s t i ng volume and al so share in new marke t volume created by 
lowered price s,  then axj / axi > O. A j oint maximum occur s if
ax/axi < 1. With  this  a s sumpt i on a qui c k  derivation w il l  demonstrate
that the pr ice r e sul t is  the same as if  the two l arge f irms combined 
to  form a pri ce-l e ad i ng dominant f irm. Of cour se a combina t i on would 
po ssibly r e sort to  some enforcement mechani sm other than the 
conj ectur al var i a t i on,  The price predict ion of the model  is $1.25, 
and the total volume pred ict ion is twelve uni t s  per per iod, At thi s 
price,  because of the cost  symmetry, a near equal spl i t  occur s i f  the 
volumes are the same. 
Global Joint Maximum• If al l sel hr s muimized t otal j oint prof i t s ,  
the prioe would b e  $1,42,  and volum e  would be ten  uni ts per period.  
Since there are no side payment s and no oonspi raoies, many schol ars  
would not  expeot  the  j oint global maximum t o  ooour . 
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Model s  of this  sort while commonly used are obv ious ly 
incompl e te, No h int i s  prov ided about whioh model might apply for any 
given treatment variab l e .  Th e  controver sy generated b y  the Ethy l  oa se 
adds a new d imension a nd j us t i f i e s  the f ormation of three hypothese s .  
One i s  that t h e  treatments have no e ffeot  a t  a l l  and t hus t h o  same 
mode! should apply aoross a l l  treatment s, An al terna t ive taken from 
the FTC argument s is that tho treatment s have an effeot on prioe s a nd 
that prioo a unde r  treatment (LAYY) will  equil ibra te near the pri ce 
leader sh ip j oint  maximum and (�NN) yield pri ce s  below tha t .  A third 
i s  that  price s under treatment s whioh incorporate only some ot the 
pract ice s  should l ie in between those of (LAYY) and ( �NN) , 
4 .  EXPERIMENTS 
Eleven e xperiment s were conduc t ed under several different 
conf igurations of the praotioe s  as shown in Table 1 . 12 In a l l  oa ses
the e conom ic parameter s are ident ical and constant for the dur a tion of 
the experiment .  In  most  oa se s a ohange in pr aot ioe s  occurred dur ing 
the cour se of the experiment so that the effect  of a ohange in 
pract i ce s  could be stud i ed .  Thus experiment 3, for example,  had the 
first e l even per i ods under the (�NN) condi tions of no pract ices a t  
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al l .  Al l ot the pract ice s were imposed on only the l arge sel ler s  for 
peri ods 12 through 15 and then a l l  pr actice s  were removed for per i od s  
16 and 17 , 
5 .  RESULTS 
The average transa c t i on price s for a l l  periods ot al l 
experiment s are graphed in Figure 3, The graph s a l so contain a 
reference to the pra c t i ce s  whioh were in foroe when the transac t i ons 
occurred, For example, in the f irst  eleven periods ot experiment 3 
whioh operated w i thout the praot ioe s, average pr ice c a n  be seen 
converging t oward the competi tive equil ibrium. Impo s i tion of  the 
pract i ces during peri od 12 is aooompanied by an i mmed i a te average 
prioe j ump .  When the prao t i co s  a r e  removed i n  peri od 15, the average 
prioe immed i a tely fal l s .  
I t  i s  apparent from Figure 3 that there i s  a sub s ta nt i al 
correl a tion be tween pr ioe s  in consecut ive peri od s .  Th u s ,  i n  a ssessing 
s t a t i st i c a l ly the effec t s  on transaction pr i ce s  of the d i fferent 
marke t ins t i tuti ons, one cannot s imply combine all observations into a 
singl e da ta s e t  and use  ord inary least squa res r egress i on analysi s, 
We considered est ima t i on of a variety of dynam ic model s w i th 
autocorrelated error structures, but decided a ga inst pur suing suoh an 
approach for two reasons, First ,  i t  is  not c l e ar that general ly 
aooepted t heoretical model s  of the dynamic adj ustment ot these type s 
of marke t s  exi st, Thus there would be an essent i al ad hoc e l ement to 
any pa rt icular model empl oyed, Seoond, and most important , we did not 
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different inst i tutional arrangement s affect pri ce s  i n  a systemat ic a nd 
economical ly ( a s  wel l a s  s t a t i s t ical ly) s i gn i f icant f a sh i on? The 
sta t i stical  anal y s i s  performed w a s  qui te simple: rather than pool ing 
observations sequent i a l ly within a given experimenta l  set t ing, we 
combi ned observations at correspondi ng point s across  trea tment s and 
experiment s ,  For example, one data set cons i s t s  of all first  per iods 
of each treatment; another of al l second per i od s; etc,  This procedure 
should remove any serial dependence but, of cour se, does so at the 
cost of a sub st a nt ial reduct i on in sample size, 
The seven treatment variables l isted i n  sec t i on 2-C above were 
incorporated a s  b i nary variables in an analysi s of variance, and the 
resul t s  are reported in Table 2,13 Each coeff icient shown i s  the
avera ge price over al l experiment s for the indica ted per i od of the 
treatment . For example, the average of f ir st peri ods prices for 
treatment ( ABYN) is t.68, and the average of f irst  per iods  pri ce s  for 
treatment (AAYY) is t.85 . The average of l ast peri ods  prices ( for 
trea tment s l onger than four periods)  i s  l owest for ( ADYN) at  t.52 and 
is highest for ( AAYY) a t  $ . 90 .  The resul t• for several peri ods  are 
shown, thus i nd i ca t ing the behavior of prices over time for d i fferent 
treatments, The resul t s  of combining the seven ca tegories into f ive 
ca tegories that are a pr iori equivalent as d i s cus sed above are al so 
included. 
The anal y si s of pr ice da ta i s  contained in three different 
subsec t i ons bel ow, and an analysi s  of vol ume and effic iency fol low s  
those, The f ir s t  sub sect ion examines  the inf 1 uence of the pract i ces 
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. taken a s  a group, The second s ubsect ion explores the rel ative 
accuracy of the model s l isted i n  section 3, The third subsect i on 
contains  a l im ited analys i s  of the indiv idual pr act ice s ,  Unless  
otherw ise sta ted al l resul t s  will  refer to the f inal peri od average
prices of trea tment s l a st ing a t  lea st  f ive consecut ive periods.  The 
tables summariz ing the resul t s  provide da ta for other periods al so but 
for the sake 01 brev i ty we sha l l  not d i s cus s them in deta i l .  
A, Resul t s: Practice s  a s  a Group 
One i s sue rai sed by the Ethy l  ca se i s  whether or not the 
pract i ce s  taken a s  a set have an effect independent of the market 
str ucture,  The fol low ing concl usi on sta tes thi s  propo s i tion formal ly, 
Conclusion 1. Average pri ce under trea tment ( LAYY) is h igher than 
average price under trea tment (f>rNN) . 
In the marke t s  examined by thi s  study the concl us i on i s  
suppor ted, A one-sided t-test of the hypothes i s  that prices under 
( LAYY) are equal to those under (f>rNN) is rej ected a t  the , O S level of 
sign i f icance ( t  = 2,0 ) , The al terna tive hypothesi s i s  that pr ices 
under ( LAYY) are higher , 
As argued earl ier we expected l i ttle difference between (AAYY) 
and ( LAYY) ,  Fur thermore, since pri ce s  under ( LAYY) and (AAYY) are not 
sign i f icantly different from each other ( t  = 0,8) it seems rea sonable 
to a sk if  pr ices in (t-rNN) are loss than prices under ( LAYY) a nd 
(AAYY) , and the answer i s  yes ( t  = 2 . 3 ) a t  the ,025 level .  We a l so 
argued a pr iori that (ADNN) wa s s imil ar to (t-rNN) , From Tables 2 and 
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TABLE 2 
First Period Second Period Third Period Fourth Period Fifth Period Sixth Period Seventh Period Eighth Period Last Periods* 
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N-NN 83 5.8 79 5.4 78 5.8 73 4.5 72 5.9 71 6.0 68 5.8 66 4.3 66 5. 7 
I 
ABNN 69 8.3 65 7.6 64 7.5 61 7.1 61 8.3 60 8.5 60 11. 6 59 8.7 58 8. l 
II ABYN 69 10.l 57 9.3 56 9.1 55 7.1 53 8.3 53 8.5 58 6.9 54 5.0 52 B.l 
III LANN 79 8.3 74 9.3 72 9.1 69 7.1 75 11. 8 75 12.0 77 11.6 - - 77 11.4 
IV AAYN 82 8,3 72 7.6 71 7. 5 55 7.1 53 8,3 63 B.5 86 11. 6 68 8.7 6q 8,1 
LAYY 80 5.1 77 5.4 81 4.9 Bl 3.8 79 4.8 82 4.9 82 4.7 85 3.9 80 4.7 
v 
AAYY 85 14.3 86 13. 2 85 12.9 85 10.0 85 11. 8 85 12.0 100 ll. 6 100 8. 7 90 11.4 
S tandard Error 14.3 13. 2 12.9 10.0 11. 8 12.0 11. 6 8.7 11.4 Regression 
R
2 .15 • 28 ,38 .59 . 57 . 54 • 64 .83 • 59 
R2 -.12 .04 .14 .42 . 34 .29 . 42 .70 .37 
I 70 4.8 75 4.5 73 4.6 70 3.8 68 4.7 67 4.7 67 5.3 65 4.1 63 4.5 
II 69 10.1 57 9.6 56 9.3 55 7 .1 51 8. l 53 8.2 58 6.8 54 5.3 52 7. 8 
III 79 8.2 73 9.6 72 9.3 69 7.1 75 11. 5 75 11. 6 77 11.8 - - 77 11. l 
IV 82 8.2 72 7.8 71 7.6 ')� 7.1 �3 8.1 63 8.2 86 11.8 68 9.1 69 7.8 
v 81 4.8 78 4.5 82 4.6 81 3.5 80 4.3 82 4.4 85 4.5 87 3.7 82 4.2 
S tandard Error 14. 3 13.5 13.l 10.0 11. 5 11.6 11. 8 9.1 Jl .1 Hegression 
R2 . 06 ,16 .28 . 53 • 52 .49 . 54 • 77 .';.'i 
R2 -.12 . 00 .12 .42 .37 • 34 .38 . 68 • 4 i 
,__ ___ =----==� --= -- - --- ,__ -·----
*Of treatments at least five periods long. 
3 1  
3 i t  i s  apparent that if  one groups {ABNN) w i th {N- NN) , the resul t ,ing 
prices are s i gnif icantly lower than they are in {AAYY) a nd {LAYY) 
{t = 3 ,0 )  a t  signif icance level s of . 005 . Note f rom Tabl e  3 tha t  none 
of the pool ing would be obj ect i onable on s t a t i st ical  grounds,  i . e. , 
the F-sta t i s t i cs are not cl ose to being s i gn i f icant . 
The average prices wider {LAYY) vary a good deal from 
experiment to  experiment , while those obt a i ned w i th (N-NN) appear to 
be lesa variable,  Using F-sta t i st i c s  to  te st the equal i ty of the 
variances ( for single period s )  leads to rej ec t i on of the nul l 
hypothesi s  ( level of s i gnif icance ,01) in some periods but not f or 
other s .  In order to  ensure that our reported resul t s  were not 
sensi tive to the a s sumpt i ons  underlying the F- and t- sta t i s t ic s ,  we 
computed the Wilcoxin rank sum s t a t i s t i c  {Lehmann 197 5 ,  ch, 1) for tho 
four th, eigh th, tenth, and f inal periods (of  regimes a t  lea st f ive 
peri ods l ong) , General ly the resul t s  are the same as those reported 
in the preceding paragraph . Pri ces under ( LAYY) are sign i f icantly 
higher than those used under ( N-NN) , and grouping the various 
trea tment s simply increa ses the sign i f icance l evel s, Table 4 gives 
sign i f icance l evel s at which you would rej ec t  the nul l hypothesi s in 
f avor of the hypothesi s that price s  under {N-NN) are l ower . 14
The d i fferences be tween the f irst  two columns are an 
ind i c a t i on of greater pr ice variab i l i ty earl ier in regimes compared to  
l ater, For instance, the per iod 4 pr ice s for  (N-NN) a nd ( LAYY) are: 
N-NN LAYY 
66 71  74 76 77 54 74 7 8  80 81 101 
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while the corresponding d a ta f or the eighth period are 
N-NN LAYY 
60 65 66 7 3  7 5  7 9  81 93 99 
The drop i n  the signif icance l evel s be tween the eighth and tenth 
per iods i s  due to a reduct i on in sample size (by one N-NN and three 
LAXY) , The f inal column reflec t s  combining the ending peri od s  f rom 
short regimes and l onger ones and i s  a s  expected intermed i a te between 
the peri od four and period eight resul t s .  
We conclude that the pract ice s  together opera te to decrea se 
pri ce compe t i tion beyond that which can be a t tributed t o  struct ure 
al one ,  Th i s  conc l us i on hol d s  when comparing (N-NN) a ga inst {LAYY) ,  
and cont inues to  hold where one groups the trea tment a pr iori  c lose to 
( N-NN) and compares the prices w i th those in {AAYY) a nd ( LAYY) , In 
fact  the only effect of the grouping i s  to increa se the level of 
sign i f i ca nce, but the qua l i ta t ive conc l usion i s  the same throughout, 
viz , , as a group pract i ces matter , 
B. Resul t s: Model Ac curacy . 
Which of the competing model s most accurately capture the 
behav ior of pri ce s? Figures for the analys i s  of thi s  quest ion are 
given in Tabl e  2 and Table 5 .  Pr ice s  w i th none of the pract ice s  
( average o f  l ast per i ods wa s t .66)  tend to  be above the compe t i tive 
equi l ibrium ct.54)  with the difference signif icant at the , 05 level 
( one-ta i l ed test ) a nd are far below the Cournot or j oint maximum 
equil ibria, Thus conclusion 2 fol low s .  
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TABLE 3 
STATISTICS FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Analysis Type 
Results 
First Periods Second Periods Third Periods Fourth Periods Fifth Periods Sixth Periods Seventh Periods Eighth Periods Last Periods 
F(7 to 5) F(2,19) = 0.966 F(2,18) = 1.461 F(2,16) = 1. 216 F(2,14) = i.001 F(2,19) = 0. 709 F(2,18) = 0.553 F(2,16) = 1. 218 F(2,14) = 1. 541 F(2111) = 0.613 
F(5 to 3) F(2,21) = 0.438 F(2,20) = 1.311 F(2,18) = 1. 316 F(2,16) = 2.639 F(2,21) = 2.357 F(2,20) = 1.482 F(2,18) = 0.683 F(2, 16) = 1. 345 F(2,13) = 0.934 
t(Y VB N) t = 0.330 t = 0.558 t = 1.394 t = 2.235 t = 1.898 t = 2.286 t = 2.623 t = 4.113 t = 3.011 
(5 Classes) DF = 21 DF = 20 DF = 18 DF = 16 DF = 13 DF = 13 DF = 12 DF = 10 DF = 13 
n = 26 n = 25 n = 23 n = 21 n = 18 n = 18 n = 17 n = 15 n = 18 
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TABLE 4 
RESULTS OF RANK SUM TESTS 
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS AT WHICH NULL HYPOTHESIS 
(NO TREATMENT EFFECT) IS REJECTED 
Period 4 
N-NN vs LAYY .12 
N-NN vs LAYY - AAYY • 07
ABNN - N-NN vs LAYY - AAYY .01 






Period 10 Last Period











t-RATIOS AND SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
FOR ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
Competitive (54) Cournot (104) Leader ' s  Joint Maximum (125) 
N-NN t 2 . 055* 6.691*** 10. 364***
S SR 1990.18 7291 . 00 15480.60 
LAYY t 5.641* 5.070* 9.569* 
S SR 5598.17 4798.60 1 3408.89 
AAYY t 3 . 1 49* 1 .  224 3.061* 
S SR 2734.47 163 3.94 2663 . 03 
Degrees of fr eedom = 1 1  
* t . 05 1. 7
96 
* * * t  = 2. 718 . 01 
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Conolusion z .  Price s under treatment (N-NN) are  above the compe t i tive 
equi l ibrium. 
From the sum of squa red r e sidua l s  one can see that the 
l ikel ihood ratio  favor s the compe t i tive equi l ibrium model over the 
Cournot or any of the other mode l s .  On this cri teri on, conclusion 3 
i s  accepted.  Th i s  oonc l us i on i s  not sensi tive to pool ing (ABNN) with 
( N-NN) . 
Conclusion 3 .  Pr i c e s  under treatment (N-NN) are  closer to the 
predic t i ons of the compe ti tive equil ibrium than to the predi c t i ons of 
the other mode l s .  
Average price under ( LAYY) i s  $ ,8 0  almost m idway b e tween the 
compe ti tive equil ibrium and the Cournot pred i c t i on and approximately 
f ive standard deviations away from each, Sta t i s t ical t e s t s  l ead to 
the rej ect ion of a hypothe s i s  that the da ta were generated from ei ther 
model at  convent ional aignif ioance l evel s ,  Of oour se, the l ikel ihood ' .  
ratio f avors the Cournot equil ibrium over the compe ti tive equil ibrium 
( sl ightly) or the predic t i ons of any other of tho l i sted model s .  
Thus, by  that cr i terion, strictly appl i ed,  the  Cournot model wins , 
Price s from treatment (AAYY) are higher ( $. 90) a nd are not 
signif icantly different from Cournot a t  convent ional l evel s ( t  = 1 .2) 
and they are signif icantly different from the predi c t i ons of other 
model s .  Th i a  prov ide s a bi t more support for the Cournot model . 
However, when ( LAYY) and ( AAYY ) are pool ed, the mean price i s  cl oser 
to the Cournot than under ( LAYY) a l one but the reduct ion in vari ance 
3 7  
doe s not appreciably inf luence s i gnifica nce l evel s obt a i ned w i th LAYY 
al one . Thus, we have Concl us i on 4. 
Conclus ion 4 .  Pr ice s generated i n  marke ts  wi th all  the pract ioe s are 
almost equidistant from the compe t i tive equil ibr ium and the Cournot 
equil ibrium.  
W i th re spect  to  the  que st ions ini tial ly posed we can  supply 
tho fol low ing answers .  First the  prices  i n  marke ts  w i thout any of  the 
prac t i c e s  are above the compe t i tive equil ibrium.  Thus some support i s  
genera ted for the ide a that marke t structur e  al one will  foster 
noncompe ti tive r esul t s . 15 Secondly, the pract ice s as a set  cause
s i gn i f i cantly higher prices ,  Of  the mode l s  considered the  most 
appropri ate mode l s  are compe t i tive w i thout the pract i c e s  and e i ther 
the compe t i tive or the Cournot w i th the pract ice s ( s l ight advantage to  
Cournot ) .  The j oint maximum mode l s  oan both be  rej ected i n  f avor 01 
the s e ,  
Tho f act  t h a t  the j oint maximum mode l s can b e  r ej ected  i s  
impor tant because a reasonable  extension of the FI'C theory o f  the 
Ethyl ca se l eads to  a type of l eader sh ip j oint maximum predic t ion and 
can  ther eby be rej ected a s  wel l .  Thi s  r e sul t l eave s us w i thout a 
compl e te theory of the inf l ue nce of the prac t i c e s .  I t  could b e  argued 
tha t price s near the Cournot equil ibrium cons t i tute a " local 
equil ibrium' ' in a proce ss  which would ul t imately term ina te  at the 
j oint maximum had i t  not go tten ' ' stuck, ' '  The ' ' lumpine s s ' ' of the uni ts 
induce s a type of discont inuity near the Co urnot equil ibrium which 
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16 might be hard to  pa ss  through, Th i s  l e ads na tur a l ly to the 
conj ectur e  that ' ' smoother ' '  demand f un c t i ons would y ield the l eade r ship 
j oint maximum. Certainly thi s  conj ectur e  can be checked  w i th 
add i tional experiment a tion,  
C, Analysi s of  Indiv idual Pract ice s,  
Thi a  study wa s not de signed t o  explore the po ssibl e e f f e c t s  or  
each pract ice independe ntly.  Only seven of the twenty possibl e 
treatment vari abl e s  were impl emented,  However, e arly in the study i t  
became cl ear that i t  would be po ssibl e t o  ga ther some data on the 
i s sue of the eff ec t s  of indiv idual pr act ice s w ithout comprom i s i ng the 
maj or goal of s t udying the prac t i c e s  as a group .  In thi s sect ion the: 
da ta are analyzed even though none of these pa ired compari sons 
relationsh ip s  di scussed here are sta t i st i ca l ly s i gn i f icant , The 
conclusi ons of thi s  section shoul d be r egarded a s  conj ectur e s  about 
what addi tional experiment s w il l  yield ba sed on the availab l e  
informat ion, 
Tabl e 6 conta ins  the resul ts  ot all t- test s on binary 
compari sons of vari abl e s .  Of cour se the se can al so be cal cul a ted  f rom 
the analysis  of various parameters  in Tab l e  2 ,  but they are incl uded 
here for convenience , 
Let  PK be the average of l ast per i ods  pri c e s  under trea tment
K, If one accept s the a priori assumpt i on that [PAANN L PLANN] then
the fol low ing inequa l i t i e s  exist  in Tabl e  6 ,  




ABYN 1. 389 0.525 
LANN 0.880 1. 357 
AAYN 0. 328 o.  962 
LAYY 1. 976 2.392 ** 
AAYY 1. 897 2.285** 
Degrees of f reedom 11 
* t
. 05 
1 .  796 
** t.025 2.201 
*** t 
. 01 m 2 , 718 
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TABLE 6 
PAI RWISE T-RATIOS 
ABYN LANN AAYN LAYY AAYY 
1. 389 0.880 o .  328 1. 976* 1. 897* 
0.525 1. 357 o .  962 2 .  392 2.285 
1. 214 1. 4 87 3.035 2. 714 
1. 214 o .  571 0.270 o. 804 
1. 4 87 0. 571 1. 214 1.500 
3.035*** o. 270 1. 214 0.783 
2. 714 ** 0.804 1.500 0 . 783 
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( 2) 
( a ssumed) 
( 3 ) PAANN L PLANN > PADNN
( 4)  PAAYN > PADYN 
( S) p ADNN ) p ADYN 
( a ssumed) 
( 6)  PAANN L PLANN > PAAYN 
( 7 )  
Tho l ef t  hand inequal i ty o f  ( 1 ) and ( 2) suppor t the ide a that 
publ ic price announcement s decrea se compe t i t i on, How ever, if such 
adverti sement s are unmoni tered by compe t i tor s ,  sl ight price de cr ea se s 
may occur a a  sugge sted by the r ight hand of ( 1) ,  ( 3 ) ,  and ( 4 ) , The 
r e sul t s  shown i n  (S) and (6)  sugge st a negative effect of the most 
favored na t ion cl ause when taken al one contrary to the i nformat i on 
theory argued by the FTC, A po si tive effect on price s caused by 
advance not i f i c a t ion i s  sugge sted by ( 7 ) ,  Th e se inequa l i t i e s  toge ther 
w ith the fact  that the highe st price s occurred w i th ( AAYY) indica te 
the po s s ib i l i ty that the effect s  of pract ice s may be  highly 
interrelated  a nd nonl inear. Examina t i on of thi s  po s s ib i l i ty led to 
the fol l ow ing c onclusi on, 
Conclusion S .  The effect s of the pr ac t i ce s  are not addi t ive and are 
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therefore interact ive.  
A model which a ssumed an addi t ive rel ationship among the 
pract ice s w a s  rej ected at  tho , 01 level ( F-test ) in favor of a model 
which assumed the existence of interact i on terms. 17 Thus any anal y s i s
of the effec t s  of indiv idual pr act ice s al one may not b e  a rel iab l e  
indica tor o f  how tho prac t ice s funct ion a s  a group, 
The r e sul t regarding most f avored na t i on and/or Rob i nson 
Pa tman type behav ior i s  particularly interest ing . We conj e ct ur e  tha t 
one key to under s tanding the i nf l uence of thi s  pr acti c e  i s  the 
structur e  of the demand s i de of the marke t .  Smal l buyer s pay higher 
price s ,  We conj ectur e  tha t  if  smal l buyer s cons t i tute a l argo 
fraction of the marke t volume, pr ice s w i th a most favored n a t ion 
cl ause w i l l  be  higher,  Conversely, if  the bulk of the marke t volum e  
i s  from l arge buyer s ,  t h o  effect o f  the practice  w il l  be to  l ower 
price s .  
D, Re sul t s :  Vol ume and  Effici ency 
Da ta on volume, price variance and efficiency are shown i n  
Tab l e  7 ,  Note  tha t  vol ume for tho more compe t i t ive regimes  ( flf-NN, 
ABNN, ABYN) t e nds to be greater than when the marke t pract ice s are in 
effect  (AAYY a nd LAYY) . In f ac t ,  of the eigh t  oa se s in the former 
group, fiv e  exceed al l  seven observations in the latter ,  two are t ied 
w i th the maximal volume under ( LAYY) and only one is l e s s  than the 
maximum (by one uni t ) , As  the difference s are by and l arge not great ,  
we  shal l not a ttempt a qua n t i ta t ive annlysi s ,  Volume tends t o  be  
Quantities(vol.) for 
Experiment 
5 8 10 
1 15 14 16 
2 15 15 17 
N-NN 3 18 17 17 
9 16 15* -
6 18 18 18 
ABNN 7 17 - -
8 18 ' 18 18 
ABYN 5 18 18 18* 
LANN 11 16 - -
AAYN 5 18 
- -
10 17 16 12 
6 18 - -
7 15 16 16 
8 15 12* -
LAYY 9 9 14 -
10 15 16 16 
11 15 16 -
AAYY 4 13 13 13 























Ef f iciencies 
5 8 
1 . 00 0.94 
0 . 99 0 . 90 
0.92 0.85 
0 . 91 0.92 
1. 00 1.00 
1 . 00 -
1 . 00 1 . 00 
r. oo 0.94 
1.00 -
0 . 94 -
1 . 00 1. 00 
1.00 -
0 . 97 1.00 
0.97 0 . 91* 
o .  67 0.99 
0.97 1.00 
1.00 1.00 
0.96 0 . 83 
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for Periods Price Variances for Periods 
10 Last 1 5 8 10 Last 
1. 00 1.00 1188.7 656 . 0  137.3 65.2 231. 3 
1. 00 1.00 1460.4 135.4 104. 2 91. 0 31. 7 
0 . 85 0 . 83 3 46.9 3 4.4 19. 4 31. 8 11. 9 
- 0.92* 83 1 . l  271.4 58.2 - 58.2 
1 . 00 1. 00 81. 2 3.0 3 . 0  2.8 3.9 
- 1. 00 11. 4  10 . 0  - - 12.4 
1.00 1.00 13. 2 12 . 6 11. 9 9.6 2 . 5  
0.87 0 . 87 580 . 6 19. 4 40.0 23.9* 23 . 9* 
- 1 . 00 3 . 6  2 2.1 - - 3.0 
- 0.87 45 . 6  1.1 - - 7 5. 0 
0. 82* 0.82* 7 87. 2 18.9 54. 2 5. 7 *  5 . 7 *  
- 1 . 00 0 . 1  o . o - - 2 . 1  
1. 00 1 . 00 3 33.9 2 7.8 0.3 0 . 2 0.2 
- 0.91* 44.5 0.3 1. 6* - 1. 6* 
- 0.98 2 2 . 5  6.8 10 . 4  - 3.9 
1. 00 1.00 66.5 5 . 5  3 . 0  4.3 4 . 3  
- 1. 00 80 . 7  0.3 0.9 - 2 . 2 
0.83 0.85 o . o o . o o . o o . o  o . o 
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higher in the a pri ori  more compe ti tive regimes and the probabi l i ty of 
such an extreme occurrence by chance ( in t erms of rank s )  is l e ss than ·
f ive  percent , 
The efficienci e s  tend t o  be high and there i s  no general 
tendency for efficiency to be systema t i c a l ly high or l ow in the two 
type s of regime s ,  Thus, po ssibly contrary to expectat ions , a t  l east  
in the  marke t s  the  marke t prac t i ce s  do not appear  to  lower eff iciency 
systematically .  Pr ice s under the prac t ice s did not ge t suffic iently 
higher than the compe ti tive equil ibrium to  subs tant i al ly affect 
efficiency, Thia resul t is  po ss ibly related t o  the ' ' lumpy ' ' demand. 
Fina l ly ,  we comment on the w ithin per iod price vari ance s,  Two 
r e sul t s  appear noteworthy . First ,  there ia  a general tendency for 
var i ance s to decl ine over time , Second, and of more sub st a nt ive · 
i ntere st ,  there i s  substant ial ly more pr ice variabil i ty w i thout the 
marke t prac t i c e s ,  I n  f ac t  ther e are a number o f  periods o f  (AAYY) a nd 
(LAYY) when al l transact i ons take pl ace a t  the same price . Th i s  never 
occur s under ( N-NN) , (ADNN) , or ( ADYN) , 
CONCLUSIONS 
The c ircumstance s of the Ethyl ca se provide an interest i ng 
context in which to expl ore the role tha t  marke t pract ice s pl ay in the 
ol igopol i s t i c  pr ice formation proce s s ,  The central i s sue for thi s  
s t udy i s  whether or not marke t pract ice s o f  the sort used i n  the 
l ead-ba sed ant i knock compound indus try can have an inf l uence over and 
above indus trial  structur e, 
The behav ior of the simple  marke ts  s t udied  here,  w i th econom ic 
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parame ter s as st ipul a ted for the l ead-ba sed ant i knock compound 
indus try, depends s igni f icantly upon the exi s tence ot such pract ice s,  
Marke t structur e  al one will  not nece ssarily account for ai l 
supracompe t i t ive pr ice s a nd prof i t s ,  Wi thout the prac t ice s pri c e s  are 
near but above the compe t i tive equil ibrium and w i th al l practice s 
price s are signif icantly higher and are e ssent i al ly m idway be tween the 
Cournot equil ibrium and the compe t i t ive equil ibrium. Th i s  r e sul t 
support s  a pre sumption that fac i l i ta t ing pr act ice s and not industrial  
concentrat ion per  ae prov ide a vehicle  for  exp l a ining industrial  
performanc e ,  Both variabl e s  are important , 
The r e sul t s  of the se experiment s are consi stent w ith other 
experiment a l  f indings . The behav ior of the no-practice  ( t el ephone ) 
marke t s  are consi stent w i th the original work of Hong and Pl o t t  
( forthcom ing ) who di scovered a tendency for such marke ts  to  converge 
ne ar the compe t i t ive equil ibrium .  Aspe c t s  of the pract ice s are 
similar to those of posted  price s which are known to have an upward 
influe nce on pr ice s (Pl o t t  and Sm i th 1 97 8 ;  Hong a nd Pl o t t  forthcom ing; 
Sm ith 1 981 ) , In this  cont ext the r e sul t s  are a l so consi stent w i th 
those of Stoecker ( 1980 ) in the sense tha t they demonstra te tha t 
conspiracy i s  not nec e s sary for marke ts  to diverge from compe t i t ive 
equil ibrium,  Thus,  the conclusions advsnced here can be seen as par t 
of a more general pa ttern of resul t s ,  
These r e sul t s  sugge st a more extensive i nv e st i ga t i on o f  the 
interre l a t i onships among practice s and the de tai l  of the indiv idual 
strate g i e s  they evoke . The FI'C advanced such a n  extension of theory 
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ut i l iz ing a hypothes i s  that information about a compe t i tor ' s act ions 
is the key vari abl e ,  But ,  the da ta indica te an incompl e tene ss of that 
par ti cul ar theory a s  fol l ow s :  ( i) a type o f  j oint maximizat ion model 
which can  be deduced from the theory rece ived l i t t l e  or no support 
from the data, and ( i i) one pract ice which appear s to  incr ea se 
i nf ormation about a compe t i t or ' s act ions r e sul t e d  in l ower price s ,  
Th i s  is  not  to  say that the  FI'C theory is  w ithout mer i t  since many of 
the other qua l i ta t ive resul t s  are in accord w i th the theory. 
Fur thermore ,  the central rol e of information i n  ol igopol i s t i c  marke ts  
has  rece ived subs tant i al support from the  experimental  work of 
Fouraker and S iegel ( 196 3 ) , 
The moat diff icul t a nd impor tant que st ions are rel a ted  to the 
r e l evance of thi s  study to the Ethyl ca se , Have simil ar practice s l ed 
to h igher price s in the l e ad-ba sed, ant iknock compound i ndustry? 
Experiment s alone cannot a nswer that que s t ion, In fact ,  because the 
industry i s  10 compl ica ted, experiment s w i th the industry i t s e l f  would ·  
not answer the que stion w i th certainty , It i s  clear  from the 
exper iment a l  work, however, that in developing a m e thod for mea suring 
the effec t s  of the pract ice s, extreme care must be exerc i sed in 
choos i ng the background s e t  of prac t i ce s  against  which the 
mea surement s are to be made , One cannot simply a ssume, for example,  
tha t  the  pr ice s w il l  be near the  Cournot equil ibr ium in the  ' ' absence ' '
of prac t i c e s  because some type s of pract i ce s  i nduce near compe ti tive 
equil ibrium behav ior, Fur thermore ,  in a ss e s sing the effec t s  of all 
pract ice s one cannot rely on genera t ing an overal l a s s e s sment by 
examining the inf l uence of one pract ice s t  a time, The general 
conc l us i on is that pract ice s anal ogous to  those of the industry 
. r e sulted i n  the highest pr ices  of a l l  the treatment s we studi ed, 
Natur a l ly que st ions regarding the ba s e s  of the analogy w i th the 
industry w i l l  ari se ,  For exampl e ,  some might feel tha t addi tional 
variabl es  should be control l ed or added in order to obtain  an 
appropriate  anal ogy. Such que stion s  can be answered by add i t i onal 
experiment a t i on w i th other pract ice s and parameters, 
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The Ethyl ca se i tsel f  has a c losely rel a ted  dimension which 
the se experimental marke t s  do not addr e ss, Pr ac t i c e s  are endogenous 
to the operations of na tur al ly occurring marke ts ,  whil e  pract ice s i n  
t h e  experimental marke t s  were f ixed a n d  impo sed, If the re sul t s  of 
the experiment a l  marke t s  are indeed  sugg e s t ive of the infl uence of the 
prac t ic e s  in the ant iknock compounds marke t s, then sel l er s  have an 
incent ive to i nvent, de sign,  and promul ga te funct iona l ly equival ent 
prac t i ce s ,  Interest ingly enough, acceptance of such prac t i ce s  may be 
a Na sh re sponse by buyers even though col l e c t ive acceptance i s  t o  
their col l ec t ive di sadvanta ge . High concentr a t i on ratios  may prov ide 
a s e t  of cond i tions suf f ic i ent for thi s  type of inst i tutional 
evolution to  occur and regard l e s s  of the dec i s i on of the Comm i s sion, 
if enforced by the cour t ,  the responde nt s may succe ssfully develop 
al terna t ive prac t i ce s .  The experiment s pre sented here do not addr e ss 




This is an experiment in the economics of market deci s ionma king. 
Var ious governmental agenc ies have provided f unds for this research . 
The instructions a re s imple and i f  you follow them caref ully and 
make good dec is ions you m ight earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you a f ter the experiment . 
In this experiment we are going to s imulate a mar ket in which some 
of you will be buyers and some of you will be seller s  in a sequence 
of ma r ket trading periods . For each per iod you will be g iven an 
envelope labeled Buyer or Seller, which descr ibes the value to you 
of any dec isions you might make dur ing that per iod . An envelope 
for a given period is to be opened j ust before the beginning of that 
period. You are not to reveal this informat ion to anyone. It is your 
own private informat ion . A blank sample is attached here as page 4 .  
Specif ic Instructions to Buyers 
Dur ing each market per iod you are free to purchase from any seller or 
seller s  as many units as you might want . Study the form on page 4 .  
For the f irst unit that you buy dur ing a trad ing period you will 
receive the amount li sted in row (1) marked 1st redempt ion value ; 
if you buy a second unit you will receive the additional amount l isted 
in row (S) marked 2nd unit redemption value ; etc . The prof its f rom 
ea ch purchase (wh ich are yours to keep) are computed by taking the 
dif ference between the redempt ion value and purchase price of the unit 
bough t .  Under no conditions may you buy a unit for a price which 
exceeds the redemption value. ln addit ion to this prof it you will 
receive a S cent commiss ion for each purchase. That is, 
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[ your earnings = (redemption value) - (purchase p r ice) + (. 05 commis s ion ) ] ,  
Suppose for example that you buy two units and that your redemption 
value for the f irst unit is $200 and for the second unit is $180. I f  
you pay $ 1 S O  for your f irst unit and $160 for the second unit, your 
earnings are : 
$ earnings f rom 1st 200 lSO + . OS S O . OS  
$ earnings from 2nd 180 160 + . O S 20 . 05 
Total $ earnings = S O . OS + 20 . 0S = 7 0 . 1 0  
The bl anks on the tab l e  wJll  h e l p  you reco rd  your profits . The t ime 
of purcha se,  sel l e r  number , and the purcha s e  p r ice o f  t h e f i r s t  un i t  
you buy dur ing t h e  f ir st p e r i o d  should be recorded on row ( 2 ) . You 
should then record the p rof i t s  on this purchase a s  directed on rows 
4 8  
(3) and (4 ) ,  At the end of the period record the tot al · of profits 
and commis sions on the last row (17) ou the page , S ubsequent periods 
should be recorded s imilarly, 
Spec i f ic Instructions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to sell to any b uyer or buyers 
as many units as you might want . St udy the sample form. The first 
unit that you sell during a trading period you obtai n  at a cost of 
the amount listed in row (2) marked cost of 1st unit ; if you sell 
a second unit, you i nc ur the cost listed in the row (6) marked cost 
of the 2nd unit ; etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours 
to kee p )  are computed by taki ng the dif ference between the price 
at which you sold the unit and the cost of the unit . Under no 
conditions may you sell a unit at a price below the cost of the uni t .  
I n  a ddit ion t o  t h i s  profit you will recei ve a S cent commiss ion for 
each sale . That i s ,  
[your earnings = (sale price of unit ) - (cost o f  unit) + ( ,05 commiss ion) ] .  
Your total profits and commiss ions for a trading period, which are 
yours to keep, are computed b y  adding up the profit and commissions on 
sales made during the trading period. 
Suppose for example your cost of the 1st unit i s  $140 and your cost 
of the second unit is $160 . For illustra t ive p urposes we will cons i der 
only a two-unit case . If you sell the first unit at $200 and the 
second unit at $190, your earnings are : 
$ earnings from 1st = 200 - 140 + . OS = 60 .05 
$ earni ngs from 2nd = 190 - 160 + , 05 = 30 . 05 
Total $ earnings • 60 . 05 + 30 . 05 = 90 . 10 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profi ts . The time 
of sale, b uyer number, and the s a le price of the f irst unit you sell 
during the 1st period should be recorded on row (1) . You s hould 
then record the profits on th is sale as directed on rows (3) and (4 ) .  
At the en d of the period record the total of profits and commiss ions 
on the last row (17) on the page . S ubseq uent periods should be 
recorded s imilarly.
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Market Organizat ion 
The market in this commodity is organized as fol lows . We open the 
market for a t rading period (a trading "day" ) .  The period l a s t s  for 
minutes . Any buyer ( seller) is free to t elephone any s e l ler 
(buyer) a t  any t ime during the period and place an order for one 
unit to be delivered at the end o f  the period . Th e price w i l l  be 
a t  the published p rice of the selle r .  [ Note tha t contrac ts a r e  only 
between buyers and sellers . ] Each party is to say to the o ther the 
f ollowing: (price), ( the other trade r ) , ( t ime) . An order is placed 
only a f ter bo th par ties have made the above s ta t ement . All orders 
are fo r single units . 
A f ter an order is placed , the buyer and seller will record the t ime 
of the order and the publ i shed price on their record shee t s . These 
should b e  rec o rd e d  as demon s t rated . 
Final Observa t ions 
1 .  Each individual has a large folder . All papers , instru c t ion s ,  
records , etc . should be p u t  into this f o l der . Leave the folder w i th 
us before leaving tonigh t . Take no t hing h �me w i th you .  
2 .  We a re able t o  advise you a l i t t l e  on making money . First you 
should rememb er that pennies add up . Over many t rades and a long 
period o f  time very small amounts earne d on individual trades can 
add up to a great deal of mone y .  Secondly , y o u  should no t e xp e c t  
your earnings to b e  s teady.  Y o u  will have some good periods and 
some bad periods . Dur ing bad t imes try not to become frus trateo . 
Just s t ay in there and keep trying and earn what you c an .  It a l l  
a d d s  u p  in t h e  end . 
Some people rush to t rade. Others f ind i t  a dvantageous to "shop" 
or spread their t rading over the perio d .  We are unaware o f  any 
particular "bes t "  s tra tegies and suggest tha t you adap
,
t accord ingly . 
The record forms somet imes lead people to think in terms o f  "markup " 
and "markdown" s t ra t egies . While we see no gener a l  problems h ere , 
they can lead to occasional mi s takes in computin g  the returns f rom 
decisions . 
3. Under no c ircumstances may you men t ion anything about a c t ivities
which might involve you and other par t i c ipants a f ter the experiment 
( i . e . , no phys i c a l  threa t s ,  dea l s  to split up a f terwards or leading 
ques tion s ) . 
4. Each individua l  will be paid in p r iva te . Your earnings are
s t r ictly your own business . 
so 
Desc r i p tion o f  Mo rket and Behavior 
The r e  a r e  four s el l ers (A, B, I ,  0) . From previous mar k e t  behavior 
it appears tha t d emond i s  inela s t ic ( p r i c e  changes do no t subs tantially 
a f f e c t  overal l ma rket vol ume) and prices have v a r i ed over a wide rang e .  
S e l l e r s  A and B have r e l a t iv e l y  l a r g e  capac i ty ,  whil e I and 0 a r e  
sma l l e r .  There is al so l ikely t o  b e  subs t a n t i a l  exc ess c apac i t y ,  
Prices 
Sel l er s  A and B adver t is e  p r i c es by e n t e r ing the price o n  the keyboard 
in t h e  seller ' s  o f f ic e .  These will be announced immed iately through 
the publ i c  d ispl ay.  Sel l er s  I and 0 opera t e  tel ephone contrac t s  with 
ind iv idual l y  agreed upon prices . 
For A and B 
1 .  P r i c e  increases mus t  b e  a nnounced one f u l l  period prior to t h e  
p er iod in which t h e  p r i c e  inc rease is to b e  e f f ec t iv e .  
2 .  Pr ice decreas es a r e  e f f ec t ive immed iat ely. 
3 .  No d iscoun t s  f rom adver t i s ed pr ices a r e  permi s s i b l e ,  
Display 
For A and B 
P er iod Price 
Compu t a tion 
Period 
Compu ta tion 
Period 
t
Price i ncreases in t0 + 2 mus t be made
before here ( l a s t  minu te changes will resul t 
in an extension o f  the t0 + 1 open) . 
If p r i c e  is reduc ed in t0 + 1 this reduced









Lowered price ls the maximum permissible in t0 + l regardless o f  previous announcements.
t + 2 advertised price 
actual price 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
- - - � 






t0 + 1  t0 + 2  t0
+ 3
Lowered price in t0 + 1 is max for t + 2 
but s ince no further lowering in to + 2 ,  







I f Price increase announced 









Price increase for to + 2 announced in to 
becomes e f fec tive here a t  ta + 2 .  
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APPROXIMATE PRICE/VOLUME RELATIONSHIPS 
The a t ta ched chart provides a mod e l  o f  the rela tionship 
be tween p r ic e  and total ma rket sales volume . Choose any p r ice on 
the ver tical axis and move your f inger ho r izontally to the curv e .  
52 
The d i s tance moved ho rizontally to the curve ind icates the approxima te 
volume at tha t p r i c e .  As can be seen , price d ecreases beyond a c er tain 
point resul t in very small inc reases in total market volume , 
The numbers d is t r ibu t ed along the c u rve ref l e c t  the total 
dollar volume o f  sales for all s ellers toge ther at eac h  p r ic e ,  
Cos t s  o f  s el lers have a s imilar s truc ture b u t  t hey are no t 
id entical . Cons id erabl e  capac ity is ava il abl e at cos t s  in the mid 
f i f ty-cent range, especially for A and B .  In t h e s e  ranges sell ers 
could eas il y  supply more units than the buyers would wan t  (as ind ica ted 
by the volume on the a t tached char t ) . 
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Prof e s sor Pl ott has  served a s  an FrC Bureau of Compe t i tion 
consul tant on the Ethy l ca se , Thi s  r e search w a s  st imul ated  by 
probl ems which surfaced i n  that cont e xt .  Some ini tial 
experimental work was  f inanced by the FrC, General funding by 
S4 SS 
s. See Sm ith ( 1 97 6 )  and Plott  ( 1 97 9 ) . 
6 . The individual woul d a sk the price and then a sk if if were the 
be st  price . If the pr ice were tw ice or more what had been 
charged by other sel lers ,  the  pa s s ive buyer would not  purchase . 
If the quoted price were anything l e ss ,  a purch a se would be made , 
the National Sci ence llounda ti on a nd the Cal tech Program of 7 • For some of the experiment s sel l er s were named A, B, I, 0 because
the l etter s B ,  C, and D sound s imil ar  and caused some t ime del ay s
a s  a re sul t .
Enterpr i se and Publ ic Pol icy i s  gratefully acknow ledged ,  We  al so 
w ish to thank J ames Angel who was the senior r e se arch a s s i stant 
for tho proj e c t .  
Ethyl Corporation, E, I ,  d u  Pont d e  Nemour s and Compsny,  PPG 
Corpora t i on and Nal co Chem ical Corporat i on, Docke t no, 9 12 8 . 
llodoral Trade Comm i s s i on ,  
llor a model o f  the inf luence o f  the speed o f  the detect ion of 
pr ice change s see George J ,  Stigler ,  ' ' A Theory of Ol igopoly, ' '
Journal of Political Economy 7 2  ( Februa ry 1 96 4 ) : 44-6 1 .
The produot i s  homogeneous 10 smal l pr ice differ ence s can 
precipi tate l arge volume change 1 ,  Fur thermore, some suppl ier s 
included ' ' me e t  or rel e a se ' ' cl aus e s  in contract s  which gua ranteed 
that the suppl ier would meet the l owe st price in the marke t or 
r e l e a se the buyer from contractual obl iga tions ,  
For a summary of  other condi tions and prac t i ce s which are  thought 
to have th i s  effect  see Scherer ( 197 1 ,  chapters 6 and 7 ) . 
8 , One f irm in the industry,  Nal co, may have had a l arger capaci ty,  
rel a t ive to other f irm s ,  than the f igure used her e .  Compl aint 
coun sel ' s  ' ' Pr oposed Finding of Fac t s, Support ing Memorandum, 
Concl u s i ons of Law and Order, ' '  pp. 3 6 -38 . 
9 .  Th e  rela tive capa c i ty of one smal l suppl ier in the i ndustry 
( Nalco )  i s  probably larger than i t s  pos s ible  counterpart  in the 
l aboratory marke t .  
1 0 .  No se ssions o f  ( AANN) were conducted ,  Dur ing t h e  cour se ot 
experimenta tion i t  became increa singly clear  tha t  the two smal l 
suppl ier s  had l ittle  marke t impact so thi s trea tment was given a 
l ow pr ior i ty ,  
1 1 . A se l l er who w i shed to  make a pr ice announcement d i d  s o  by 
enter ing a period number in the di spl ay .  A publ ic s i gnal woul d 
then be made by the experimenter which alerted a l l  partic ipant s 
that a price announcement was to be made for the per iod entered 
on tho di spl ay,  Al l par t i c ipant s would then  chock tho  rece iver 
uni t s .  Af ter a brief wait ,  tho now pr ice  for the announced 
period would be e ntered.  
1 2 ,  A total of twenty- four experiment s wore conducted,  The f irst  
e i ght were considered as  pilots  in which many of the system bugs 
were el imina ted. Several of the twenty-four were conducted prior 
to the construction of the price signal ing device d i s cussed abov e 
and a l l  were di scarded because of various prob l ems relating t o  
procedures ,  record s ,  mistake s,  e t c ,  Tw o  more experiment s were 
el imina ted, one because of a rul e inf ract ion invol v ing a b inding 
comm i tment to  a futur e  contract ,  and a second be cause i t  was  
conducted i n  a different f ac i l i ty where tel ephone conversations 
could be overheard by other buyers  and s e l l er s ,  The l a tter 
probl em was  di scovered only after a subj e c t  cal led it to our 
a ttent i on near the end of the experiment , 
13 , Tho average prico a for each per i od are taken a s  the depende nt 
variable for tho anal y s i s  of vari ance and they wore not weighted 
to  reflect difference s in sample  size  (which for most treatment s 
wore smal l )  a s  the volun10 or number of transactions i s  endogenous 
to tho system, 
1 4 .  Under the nul l hypothesi s of no treatment effect,  tho 
distribut i ons of the pr ice s shoul d be the same.  If the 
al terna t iv e  hypoth e s i s  include s change in sca l e  as wel l as 
5 7  
loca t ion, t h o  Wil coxin t e s t ,  whi l e  giv ing t h o  correct 
sign i f i cance l ev e l s  may not be very powerful , We a l so computed 
the  sta t i s t i c  T sugge sted by Lepage ( 197 1 ,  1 97 3 )  for thi s  c l a s s  
o f  al terna t iv e s  w ith tho fol l owing r e sul t s ,  ( N-NN) ver sus
(LAYY) : fourth period, approximate sign i f icance l evel . 1 ;  e i ghth 
per i od, , 02;  tenth per iod, not sign i f icant;  last  per i od, 
sign i f i ca nce l evel  be tween , l  and , 2 ,  ( ADNN) and ( N-NN) ver sus 
(LAYY) and (AAYY) : f our th per i od, approximately , OS ;  e i gh th 
period, aignif icance l evel more extr eme than , 01 ;  tenth per i od, 
not s i gn i f icant ; and l a st per i od, sign i f icance l evel  be twe en , 01 
and , 02 ,  
15, A more extensive examina t i on of th i s  propo s i t ion should i ncl ude 
as a hypothe s i s  that the shape of tho supply curve may be 
important . 
16 , See Scherer ( 1 97 0 ,  pp, 206-208 ) for a di scus s i on of how lumpy 
demand make s price coordina t i on diff icul t ,  
17 , Consider tho fol l ow ing ANOVA mode l : 
p = aNNN + �A + yP + 6D + eAA + interact i on t erms among A, P, D, 
AA, where 
N-NN = 1 if no pract ice s a l l owed; 0 otherwise , 
A =  1 if advert i s ing i s  a l l owed; 0 otherw i se .  
AA = 1 i f  adverti sing i s  ava ilabl e t o  a l l ;  0 otherw ise . 
P = 1 if po sted price s ;  0 otherw ise , 
D = 1 if no di scoun t s  a l l owed; 0 otherw ise, 
p = average pr ice s, 
S B  
The t e st o f  the hypothe s i s  that the coe f f ic i ent s o f  the 
interact i on terms are a l l  z ero is r ej ected in favor of the more 
general model .  Since the de sign used only seven cel l s, one 
cannot e st imate  the coe f f i c i ent s of the interact i on term s ,  though 
one can compute the sum of squared r e si dua l s  f or that mode l which 
i s  al l tha t  i s  requi red for the F-te s t .  In fact ,  thi s  i s  j ust 
the f igure shown i n  Tabl e 2 for the seven variab l e  mode l .  
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